The effects of minimum wage policy on the long-term care sector by Vadean, Florin & Allan, Stephen
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Vadean, Florin and Allan, Stephen  (2017) The effects of minimum wage policy on the long-term
care sector.   Discussion paper. PSSRU, Canterbury
DOI








University of Kent 





Tel: 01227 823963 
pssru@kent.ac.uk 
London School of Economics 
London School of Economics 




Tel: 020 7955 6238 
pssru@lse.ac.uk 
The effects of minimum wage 
policy on the long-term care 
sector 
Florin Vadean and Stephen Allan 
Personal Social Services Research Unit 
University of Kent 









This is independent work commissioned and funded by the Policy Research Programme in the 
Department of Health from the Economics of Social and Health Care Research Unit (ESHCRU). 
ESHCRU is a joint collaboration between the University of York, London School of Economics and 
University of Kent. The views expressed are those of the authors and may not reflect those of the 
funders. 
We would like to thank Skills for Care for sharing with us the National Minimum Dataset for Social 
Care (NMDC-SC), and Roy Price for helpful assistance on its use. 
 
Abstract 
Through the combined increase in the National Minimum Wage rate in October 2015 and the 
introduction of the National Living Wage in April 2016, workers aged 25 and over paid at minimum 
wage, had an over 10 percent pay raise. The long-term care (LTC) sector in England is a labour 
intensive, low pay sector, and as such, can be substantially affected by changes in minimum wage 
legislation. We assess the effects of this exogenous wage increase on independent LTC providers by 
looking at effects on wages, employment, employment conditions, productivity, and staff stability. 
Using data from the National Minimum Data Set for Social Care (NMDS-SC) and applying a ’before-
after’ analysis, we find that the substantial increase in minimum wage had a strong and positive 
effect on wages in the LTC sector, with quite substantial compression of the wage distribution at the 
lower end. Although, as in many other studies, the employment effect is elusive, we find that this 
might be at least partially explained by a negative effect on employment conditions. Everything else 
equal, minimum wage policy had a positive effect on employment on zero-hours contracts, meaning 
that it contributed significantly to slowing down the downward trend in employment on zero-hours 




The introduction of the National Living Wage (NLW) in April 2016 is a major labour market 
intervention, with the target of increasing wages for minimum wage workers aged 25 and over to 60 
percent of median earnings by 2020. In 2015/16, it boosted the year-on year wage growth for 
minimum wage workers aged 25 and over by more than 10 per cent, through the combined October 
2015 National Minimum Wage (NMW) rate increase (from £6.50 to £6.70) and the new April 2016 
NLW rate of £7.20. This represents more than three times the 2015/16 growth in median earnings 
(of 3.1 percent), and was one of the highest increases in national minimum wage since its 
introduction in April 1999 (Low Pay Commission 2016). 
These wage increases create payroll costs for employers, and stakeholders in several labour 
intensive, low-pay sectors – including long-term care (LTC) – expressed concerns about future 
sustainability (Low Pay Commission 2016). Compared to other sectors, the LTC sector faced an 
additional constraint to adjusting to the payroll cost increase – reduced public expenditure. A large 
proportion of services users are publicly funded, and local authorities with adult social care 
responsibilities experienced substantial cuts in social care funding over the last few years due to 
austerity measures (Fernandez, Snell et al. 2013, Luchinskaya, Simpson et al. 2017). Therefore, care 
providers lack the flexibility of passing cost increases on to charged fees, and changes to minimum 
wage legislation are expected to have a noticeable impact on the sector. The main concerns are that 
the increase in minimum wage will negatively affect employment, wage distribution, wage 
differentials, promotion prospects, employment conditions, quality of care, market sustainability 
and/or non-compliance with minimum wage regulation (Machin, Manning et al. 2003, Gardiner 
2015a, Gardiner 2015b, Gardiner, Hussein 2015, Low Pay Commission 2016). 
The majority of the studies on the impact of minimum wage have focused on employment effects. 
Starting with the ‘new minimum wage research’ at the beginning of the 1990s (Card 1992, Card, 
Krueger 1994, Card, Krueger 1995) a large strand of literature developed showing mainly that 
although minimum wage policy had significant positive effects on wages, it had no or very small 
negative effects on employment. These studies were based on either “natural experiments”, by 
comparing a group of workers directly affected by a change in minimum wage (e.g. fast-food 
employers) with a similar group in a neighbouring area not affected by minimum wage, or state-
panel approaches, exploiting the geographic variation in the share of workforce affected by 
minimum wage. Employment effects were ‘elusive’ despite studies focusing on groups with high 
shares of employees on minimum wage (e.g. teenagers or low educated workers) or low-wage 
sectors (e.g. hospitality, retail or social care), for which one would expect an upward bias due to 
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selection. A number of literature reviews and meta-studies give a good overview of this research 
strand (Metcalf 2008, Doucouliagos, Stanley 2009, Belman, Wolfson 2014, Linde Leonard, Stanley et 
al. 2014, Chletsos, Giotis 2015, Schmitt 2015). 
A second strand of literature based on time-series analysis and applying panel data analysis to 
worker groups more likely to be affected by minimum wage policies (e.g. teenagers or less educated 
workers) supports, on the other hand, the view that minimum wages reduce employment of low-
wage workers (Neumark, Wascher 2008, Neumark, Salas et al. 2014). Although, some recent studies 
argue that the negative employment effects of minimum wage are mainly due to geographical (and 
sectoral) trends in employment that are unrelated to minimum wage policy (Addison, Blackburn et 
al. 2009, Dube, Lester et al. 2010, Allegretto, Dube et al. 2011, Addison, Blackburn et al. 2012, Dube, 
Lester et al. 2016, Allegretto, Dube et al. 2017). After properly controlling for these trends, the 
studies find no evidence to suggest a negative effect on employment.  
As presented in (Hirsch, Kaufman et al. 2015), economic theory offers a few explanations for the 
reason for the ‘elusive employment effect’ of minimum wage, depending on the theoretical 
approach. The standard competitive model predicts the main adjustment – to a wage level set above 
the competitive wage – to be through declining employment, but allows also for adjustment through 
increasing prices to consumers, reduction in non-pay benefits, reduction in training, and/or changes 
in the skill mix. In the institutional model, firms are assumed to operate below maximum efficiency 
because it is costly to identify, implement, and maintain practices that continuously maximise 
efficiency. In this context, a minimum-wage increase would give employers an incentive to improve 
efficiency (Kaufman 2010, Hirsch, Kaufman et al. 2015). Higher wages may also increase workers 
productivity by inducing them to work harder to ensure that they keep their job or by increasing job 
satisfaction (Akerlof 1982, Shapiro, Stiglitz 1984, Hirsch, Kaufman et al. 2015). Moreover, by 
increasing the spending power of low-wage workers, a minimum-wage increase might act as an 
economic stimulus, increasing demand for the firms’ output (Aaronson, Agarwal et al. 2012, Hirsch, 
Kaufman et al. 2015). In the dynamic monopsony model, monopsony power comes from labour 
market frictions (i.e. employers face real costs associated with hiring new workers and workers incur 
costs to finding new jobs). These frictions put workers at a disadvantage; employers pay less than 
the competitive labour market wage, in order to maximise profit, and typically operate with unfilled 
vacancies. Therefore, a minimum wage set below the market competitive wage could raise both 
wages and employment (Hirsch, Kaufman et al. 2015, Schmitt 2015, Manning 2016).  
Probably the first study that looked at the employment effects of minimum wage in the English LTC 
sector was (Machin, Manning et al. 2003). They surveyed care homes in England before and after the 
4 
introduction of the minimum wage in April 1999, and obtained data from about 2,000 care homes 
on workforce, care home characteristics, and managers view about minimum wage; their balanced 
panel included 641 care homes. They found that the minimum wage introduction had a compression 
effect at lower levels of the wage distribution, generating an about 30 percent spike at minimum 
wage. Moreover, they found a positive and significant effect on average wages and a modest 
negative effect on employment, but no effects on prices or productivity.  
Given the low effects on employment, a few further studies tried to identify mechanisms that care 
home might have used to adjust to the NMW introduction. Using data from the same care home 
survey above, (Machin, Wilson 2004) find that minimum wage had no effect on home closures 
either; (Georgiadis 2013), however, find that the wage costs generated by the April 1999 NMW 
introduction were at least partly offset by lower monitoring expenses, measured as the ratio of 
supervisors to supervised employees. (Draca, Machin et al. 2011) using data from the Financial 
Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database, find evidence that the NMW introduction reduced the 
profitability of UK firms, and in particular care homes’ profitability (i.e. gross profit margin). 
The introduction of the NLW in April 2016 generated a new interest in the analysis of effects of 
minimum wage on the LTC care sector. (Gardiner 2016) using data from the National Minimum Data 
Set for Social Care (NMDS-SC) found no evidence that LTC providers reduced employment hours in 
order to offset the increased payroll cost after the NLW introduction, but an increased compression 
of the wage distribution at lower wage levels. A further study commissioned by the Low Pay 
Commission (Giupponi, Lindner et al. forthcoming) aims to replicate the earlier work of (Machin, 
Manning et al. 2003) and (Machin, Wilson 2004). Their results from primary data analysis of a survey 
of care homes in England show that the share of care assistants (i.e. care workers) paid below £7.20 
decreased from about 60 percent to about 4 percent with the NLW introduction, with significant 
increases in average wages. However, despite the large effects on wages, they found no effects on 
employment, prices or productivity (Low Pay Commission 2016). 
Our study adds to the literature on the effects of minimum wage in the LTC sector in several ways. 
Using the National Minimum Data Set of Social Care (NMDS-SC), a large and rich dataset of LTC 
establishments in England we are able to look not only at effects on care homes, but also on 
domiciliary care providers. We also discriminate for each service type between private (i.e. for-
profit) and voluntary (i.e. not-for-profit) establishments. We believe the distinction to be important, 
as the voluntary sector has traditionally paid relatively higher hourly wages and offered better 
employment conditions (Skills for Care 2016a, Skills for Care 2016b). Finally, we explore an 
alternative adjustment mechanism, not captured by the previous literature, i.e. the share of care 
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workers employed on zero-hours contracts. Although under substantial criticism due to the 
arguments of low job and financial security offered to employees, care providers could use zero-
hours contracts to decrease costs, by increasing the efficiency of labour input (CIPD 2013). 
Our results show that the minimum wage increase had a strong and positive effect on the increase in 
the average wage at establishment level between July 2015 and September 2016. The minimum 
wage also generated quite a substantial compression at low wage levels. In care homes, for example, 
the share of workers at, or below, minimum wage increased from about 30 percent in July 2015 to 
about 40 percent in September 2016. The effects on employment are, nonetheless, insignificant. We 
find, however, that everything else equal, both the share of staff paid initially under the new 
minimum and the initial wage gap (i.e. the average increase in wages needed to bring staff pay to 
the mandatory minimum) had a negative effect on employment conditions, as measured by the 
share of staff on zero-hours contracts. 
In the next sections, we give a brief overview of the minimum wage policy in the UK and the English 
LTC labour market, we present the dataset, the sample analysed, and the empirical strategy, and 
then discuss the results and conclude. 
The National Minimum Wage in the UK 
The National Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced in April 1999 with two rates: £3.00 for workers 
aged 18 to 21, and £3.50 for workers aged 22 or older. Since October 2000 the rates have been 
adjusted yearly on advice from the Low Pay Commission, new rates have been introduced (i.e. one 
for workers aged 16 to 17 in October 2004, and one for apprentices in October 2010), and the age 
bands have been slightly changed. In October 2015 (i.e. the last adjustment before the introduction 
of the National Living Wage (NLW), there were four NMW hourly rates: £3.30 for apprentices, £3.87 
for workers aged under 18, £5.30 for workers aged 18 to 20, and £6.70 for workers aged 21 and 
over. 
The NLW was introduced in April 2016 for workers aged 25 and over at a rate of £7.20, representing 
56 percent of median hourly earnings. It is different form the other rates in that it is adjusted yearly 
every April, and has a target of increasing wages for minimum wage workers aged 25 and over to 60 
percent of median earnings by 2020. Conversely, the NMW rates are adjusted every October based 
on affordability, i.e. rates are negotiated between stakeholders to ‘help as many low-paid workers as 
possible without damaging their employment prospects’ (Low Pay Commission 2016). 
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The long-term care workforce 
Skills for care estimated that the number of people working in the LTC sector in England in 2015 was 
about 1.43 million, filling about 1.55 million jobs. The majority of these, or about 80 percent, were 
jobs with independent sector employers (i.e. about 60 percent in the private sector and further 20 
percent in the voluntary sector). In terms of service groups, most jobs were in residential care (i.e. 
care homes with or without nursing; 43 percent) and domiciliary care (e.g. home care; 42 percent) 
(Skills for Care 2016a). 
Due to rising demand for care services, the workforce has grown steadily, even given reduced public 
funding for adult social care. Between 2009 and 2015, the number of LTC jobs has increased by 
about 3 percent per year (Skills for Care 2016a), while over the same period, public spending on LTC 
services in England dropped by about 17 percent (to about £14bn, after excluding the transfers from 
the NHS to adult social care made through the Better Care Fund) (The Health Foundation 2017).  
Despite the strong increase in demand and employment, and probably reflecting the reduced public 
funding, pay and conditions in in the care sector in England rank rather poorly (Gardiner, Hussein 
2015). The average hourly wage for care workers – the frontline of the direct care staff and 
representing over half (52 percent) of the jobs in the care sector – was £7.46 in 2015/16; this pay 
rates being at about the 10th percentile and less than half the mean UK hourly earnings. Care 
workers were paid slightly better in domiciliary care (£7.58; without taking into account travel time 
between clients) than in residential care (£7.20), and in statutory local authority jobs (£9.67) than in 
the independent sector (£7.35) (Skills for Care 2016a, Skills for Care 2016b, Low Pay Commission 
2016). The distribution of wages in the LTC sector are also quite significantly compressed at low 
wage levels compared to other sectors, with the ratio of minimum wage to median pay (i.e. the 
‘bite’) at about 78 percent in 2013, compared to only 52 percent overall (Gardiner, Hussein 2015). 
Although majority of the LTC workforce are employed on permanent contracts (90 percent), a 
quarter of them (24 percent) where employed in 2015/16 on zero-hours contracts, with the highest 
proportion in domiciliary care (49 percent) and among care workers (58 percent) (Skills for Care 
2016b). Opportunities for progression are also reported to be rather limited, with a flat hierarchy in 
which the ratio of senior care workers to care workers in domiciliary services declined from 7 to 4 
percent between 2008 and 2012 (Gardiner, Hussein 2015). 
Given such pay and conditions, it is rather surprising employment in the sector rose. The evidence 
seem to show that the majority of workers entering the sector have low education and limited 
access to higher paid jobs and/or are looking for part-time or flexible working time jobs that can be 
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fitted around other (caring) responsibilities. The majority of social care workers are female (80 
percent), with mean age about 43, having a low level of formal qualifications, and with a growing 
number of migrants (Gardiner, Hussein 2015). However, despite the increase in employment, care 
providers are reporting high turnover (27 percent) and vacancy rates (7 percent), providing an 
important challenge to the provision of quality services (Skills for Care 2016b). 
Methods and data 
Following (Machin, Manning et al. 2003), we use two measurements for the importance of minimum 
wage policy for individual establishments: a) the share of workers employed by establishment 𝑖 
being paid less than the future minimum wage rate; and b) the ‘wage gap’, i.e. the relative increase 
in labour cost for establishment 𝑖 needed to bring workers being paid less than the future minimum 
up to the minimum, or: 
 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖 =
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑊𝑗𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 −𝑊𝑗𝑖 , 0)𝑗
∑ 𝑊𝑗𝑖𝑗
 (1) 
where 𝑊𝑗𝑖 denotes the hourly wage earned by worker 𝑗 in establishment 𝑖, and 𝑊𝑗𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 stands for the 
National Minimum Wage rate applying for worker 𝑗 in establishment 𝑖. 
For the empirical analysis, we aim to establish if, everything else equal, establishments that initially 
had the highest share of workers paid less than the future minimum wage and those with the 
highest wage gap were indeed affected mostly by the increase in the wage floor.  
The wage equation has the form: 
 ∆𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀1𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
where ∆𝑊𝑖,𝑡 is the change in the log of average hourly wage for establishment 𝑖 between 𝑡 − 1 (i.e. 
July 2015) and 𝑡 (i.e. September 2016), 𝑀𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 stands for one of the two measurements defined 
above for capturing the importance of minimum wage policy for establishment 𝑖 in the period 𝑡 − 1, 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 are worker, establishment level and regional characteristics in the period 𝑡 − 1 that could 
affect the wages, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term.  
When estimating the effect of minimum wage on employment, we control also for the change in the 
log of the clients served by the establishment (∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡), as an increase in clients (i.e. demand) may 
have a positive effect on employment: 
 ∆𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀2𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
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The equation used to assess further potential effects of minimum wage on employment conditions 
(i.e. share of workers employed on zero-hours contracts), skill mix (i.e. share of staff with nursing 
qualification), productivity (i.e. service users per staff rate), turnover rate and vacancy rate – 
denoted by 𝑌𝑖  – is similar to Equation 2, but includes an additional control for the initial state of the 
outcome of interest (𝑌𝑖,𝑡), as this can determine the size of the change: 
 ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼3 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀3𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
Equations 2, 3 and 4 are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
For this analysis, we use data from the National Minimum Data Set for Social Care (NMDS-SC), an 
online database on the LTC workforce across England collected by Skills for Care, and holding 
information on around 25,000 establishments and 700,000 workers. The dataset is updated regularly 
by employers, and provides rich information about establishment characteristics (e.g. location, type 
of care provided, capacity, occupancy, and client type) and workforce (e.g. demographic 
characteristics, job role, contracted hours, pay, qualifications, and training). The NMDS-SC is the 
main source of workforce information for the LTC sector in England. However, as data is employer 
reported and not verified by any other records, it is likely to be affected by reporting errors and 
should, therefore, treated with caution (Gardiner 2016, Hussein 2017). 
There are two NMDS-SC analysis files, one at establishment level and one at worker level, both being 
fully anonymised. We used mainly establishment level data for the analysis, but worker data is used 
to generate establishment level variables capturing the workforce age and gender structure, wages 
and contract types. We focused the analysis on the period July 2015 to September 2016 and, thus, 
capturing the October 2015 NMW update and the introduction of the NLW in April 2016. We 
allowed a six month period after the NLW introduction, in order to capture changes for providers 
who updated their NMDS-SC entries with a delay. We excluded provider records that were not 
updated for a long time: for the July 2015 cut-off, records that were not updated since the last NMW 
update (i.e. October 2014), and for the September 2016 cut-off, records that were not updated since 
April 2016. After excluding also establishments with incomplete data, our worker sample includes 
for July 2015 about 190,000 workers in 6,000 establishments, while for September 2016 about 
170,000 workers in 5,500 establishments. 
As illustrated by kernel density distributions, the increase in national minimum wage during this 
period has generated quite a substantial compression of the wage distribution around the new NLW 
level in the case of LTC workers employed in residential care, with rather limited spillover to higher 
wage rates (see Figure 1). While in July 2015 around 30 percent of residential care employees had an 
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hourly wage at or below the adult NMW rate (i.e. £6.50), in September 2016 about 40 percent of 
them were paid at or below the adult NLW rate of £7.20.1 In the case of domiciliary care employees, 
the wage distribution compression has also been substantial: in July 2015 around 15 percent of them 
had an hourly wage at or below the adult NMW rate, while in September 2016 about 30 percent had 
hourly wages at or below the adult NLW. Nonetheless, in the case of domiciliary care employees, 
Figure 1 reveals also some spillover to higher hourly wages, mainly around £7.50 and £8.00.2 
Figure 1. Kernel density estimates of LTC workers hourly wage employed in the independent 
sector by care type – July 2015 and September 2016 
 
Note: The sample includes LTC workers employed by independent sector providers with up-to-date records. Source: Skills 




Table 1 presents differences between the beginning and the end of the observed period for the 
dependent outcomes of interest, without controlling for any influencing factors. We can observe 
that in July 2015 the lowest average hourly wages were in residential care and private domiciliary 
care, all around £7.70-7.80, while in voluntary domiciliary care providers paid on average £1.30 (or 
16 percent) higher hourly wages. Average hourly wages have increased significantly between July 
2015 and September 2016. The highest increase being for residential care employees (about 36p, or 
about 4.6 percent). This increase represents less than half the 10.8 percent pay rise experienced by 
the lowest paid care workers aged 25 and over, and confirms the substantial compression in the 
wage distribution around minimum wage illustrated in Figure 1. This could also partly explain the 
fact that employment was rather unaffected.  
                                                          
1 See for comparison (Gardiner 2016). 
2 It is rather interesting to note that while the July 2015 wage distribution for domiciliary care employees had 
the highest peak at £7.00 per hour (i.e. £0.50 above the NMW rate at that time), the September 2016 
distribution peaked at NLW level. That is probably showing that domiciliary care providers might have used to 
pay wages above the minimum in order to compensate for travel time, but since the introduction of the NLW, 
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Another potential adjustment mechanism is through contractual conditions, with zero-hours 
contracts potentially allowing service providers to allocate labour input more cost-effectively. 
Despite public perception, the data reveals that with the exception of private domiciliary care, the 
average share of workers employed on zero-hours contracts is not high in LTC. In July 2015 the share 
was 4 percent in private residential care, 5.4 percent in voluntary residential care, and 10 percent in 
voluntary domiciliary care. For all above employer groups the share decreased over the period 
analysed to less than 4 percent, most probably due to the large criticism of zero-hours contracts 
used by employers and the government attempts to limit employers abuse of such contracts (e.g. 
ban of exclusivity clauses) (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 2015). For private 
domiciliary care providers the average share of workers on a zero-hours contract was rather stable 
over the period, at about 44 percent. Nonetheless, we have to mention substantial differences 
between individual service providers in the use of zero-hours contracts within service types.  
Regarding the share of staff with nursing qualification, this was highest for private residential care 
(about 5.5 percent), mostly due to the fact that nursing homes are predominantly operated by for-
profit providers, and that domiciliary LTC services with nursing are rather rare. The skill mix was also 
constant over the period analysed for all provider groups. 
Productivity, as measured by the service users per staff rate, was highest for the voluntary sector; in 
July 2015, this had an average of 2.07 for voluntary residential care establishments (compared to 
1.67 in the private sector) and 2.67 for voluntary domiciliary care establishments (compared to 0.93 
in the private sector). The rather substantial difference in productivity between the two sectors in 
domiciliary care provision would explain (at least partially) the hourly pay premium earned by 
workers in voluntary domiciliary care.  
Despite the quite substantial increase in wages, staff stability and vacancies seem to have not 
improved. Staff turnover was highest and increasing between July 2015 and September 2016 in the 
private sector: from 23 percent to 27 percent in private residential care, and from about 28 to 30 
percent in private domiciliary care, while in the voluntary sector turnover was somewhat lower 
(around 18-19 percent) and rather stable. At the same time, the vacancy rates were on average 
stable, with the highest in private domiciliary care (8.5 percent), and about half that in the other 
provision groups (about 4 percent). 
Some features of the establishment sample are described in Table 2. The share of workers paid in 
July 2015 less than the October 2015/April 2016 mandated minimum was on average quite high: 50 
percent in residential care and 30 percent in domiciliary care. However, the wage gap at July 2015 
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(i.e. the relative increase in wages needed to bring workers being paid less than the future October 
2015/April 2016 minimum up to the that mandated minimum) was rather small (3.9 percent in 
residential care and 1.8 percent in domiciliary care). It is important to notethat the wage gap was 
also smaller than the average hourly wage increase in the analysed period (4.9 percent in residential 
care and 3.3 percent in domiciliary care) and, thus, confirming that providers increased wages more 
than required and/or increased wages for employees paid above minimum as well (i.e. spillover 
effect); see also (Gardiner 2016).  
In terms of other characteristics of the sample, the mean worker age at July 2015 was about 42 
years, with about 80 percent of staff being female, and majority of staff being care workers (i.e. 
frontline, direct care staff), about 65 percent in residential and 77 percent in domiciliary care 
establishments. Moreover, the majority of establishments are small (i.e. 10 to 49 workers; 63 
percent of residential and 48 percent of domiciliary care establishments). We also control for service 
user type, change in LA-level social care financing (proxied by the difference in residential care costs 
between 2015/16 and 2014/15) and changes in the local labour market (proxied by the difference in 
the LA-level Job Seeker Allowance uptake rate). 
Results 
OLS estimation results of Equations 2, 3 and 4 for each outcome of interest and service type are 
presented in Table 3. For brevity we present only coefficients for the two variables capturing the 
importance of minimum wage policy for individual establishments, i.e. the share of workers paid less 
than the future mandatory minimum wage (i.e. October 2015/April 2016) and the wage gap at July 
2015.3 In order to allow for differential effects by sector, we interacted the two above variables with 
the sector variable (i.e. private or voluntary). All estimations include controls for worker 
characteristics (i.e. mean worker age, the share of female workers, and the share of care workers in 
total staff), establishment characteristics (i.e. size, sector, and user type), and local area 
characteristics (i.e. the change in LA-level social care financing as measured by the change in 
residential care unit costs over the analysed period, and the change in the local unemployment 
level). We also use regional dummies to control for any further geographic differences in social-
demographic characteristics not captured by the above factors. 
For both service types and sectors there is evidence that establishments with a higher share of low-
wage workers in the months before the increase in the wage floor experienced a higher average 
                                                          
3 The full set of estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
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wage increase, the effects are statistically significant and large. A residential care establishment with 
50 percent of its workers being paid in July 2015 less than the future minimum wage (i.e. an average 
residential care establishment) experienced average wage growth of about 3.6 percent higher than 
one that had 10 percent of its workers paid less than the future minimum wage.4 This is sizable given 
that the average wage growth during the period was about 4.9 percent, and is comparable with the 
effect the minimum wage introduction had in 1999 on care homes found by (Machin, Manning et al. 
2003). 
In comparison, a domiciliary care establishment with 30 percent of its workers being paid in July 
2015 less than the future minimum wage (i.e. an average domiciliary care establishment) 
experienced average wage growth of about 1.6 percent higher than one that had 10 percent of its 
workers paid less than minimum, while the average wage growth in domiciliary care during the 
period was about 3.3 percent.5 
Similar to many previous studies on the effects of minimum wage – for an overview see (Manning 
2016) – our results confirm the ‘elusiveness’ of employment effects; for both sectors and service 
types, the estimated effects on employment are statistically insignificant. This is not really surprising. 
Due to cuts in publicly funded social care, providers were likely to use staffing rather efficiently. 
Decreasing staffing further, would probably not be possible without seriously affecting quality, 
which is regularly monitored by the Care Quality Commission (CQC). 
One potential adjustment mechanism LTC providers might use to compensate for the increase in 
operation cost is increasing the efficiency of labour input in the production of care services by 
switching to more flexible contractual agreements (e.g. zero-hours contracts). Our results suggest 
that everything else equal, the share of low-wage workers in the months before the increase in the 
wage floor and the wage gap had a positive effect on the change in the share of workers employed 
on zero-hours contracts.  
The effects are not statistically different by sector, but are larger for domiciliary care compared to 
residential care. A residential care establishment with 50 percent of its workers being paid in July 
2015 less than the future minimum wage (i.e. an average residential care establishment) 
experienced a 0.8 percentage points higher change in zero-hours contract rate than one that had 10 
percent of its workers paid less than the future minimum.6 The effect is quite large, given the fact 
                                                          
4 The calculation is 0.090x(0.5-0.1)=0.036. 
5 The calculation is 0.081x(0.3-0.1)=0.016. 
6 The calculation is 0.020x(0.5-0.1)=0.008. 
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that the average (unweighted) change over the period in the share of residential care workers 
employed on zero-hours contracts was -1.3 percent (i.e. from 4.5 percent to 3.2 percent). 
A domiciliary care establishment with 30 percent of its workers being paid in July 2015 less than the 
future minimum wage (i.e. an average domiciliary care establishment) experienced a 2.6 percentage 
points higher change in zero-hours contract rate than one that had 10 percent of its workers paid 
less than the future minimum.7 Again, the effect is quite large, considering that the average 
(unweighted) change over the period in the share of domiciliary care workers employed on zero-
hours contracts was -3.1 percent. 
In general, our findings show that the increase in the wage floor had an important effect on slowing 
down the downward trend in employment on zero-hours contracts. 
In terms of other outcomes, we find that the minimum wage policy had no significant effect on 
changes in productivity (i.e. the service user per staff rate) or skill mix (i.e. the share of staff with 
nursing qualification), but had a positive effect on changes in turnover and vacancy rates in the case 
of voluntary residential care establishments. Given the reputation of the voluntary sector to offer 
better employment conditions, these results seem quite surprising. However, due to the 
compression of the wage distribution at low wage levels, the wage difference in pay between the 
private and voluntary residential care providers has become relatively less important (see Table 1). 
Moreover, descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that on average a voluntary residential care worker 
had to cater for more clients (i.e. about 2.05) compared to a private residential care worker (i.e. 
1.67). All this might have helped private care homes to become more attractive to care staff. 
Nonetheless, as of September 2016 voluntary residential care establishments still had an about 8 
percentage point lower turnover rate compared to private ones.  
Conclusions 
The introduction of the National Living Wage in April 2016 is a major policy intervention on the 
labour market, with the aim of increasing the minimum wage for workers aged 25 and over to 60 
percent of median pay. Such a significant increase in the wage floor has prompted concerns about 
potential negative effects on employment and affordability, in particular a labour intensive, low-pay 
sector such as LTC.  
                                                          
7 The calculation is 0.129x(0.3-0.1)=0.022. 
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The results of our analysis confirm the findings of previous studies that despite sizable effects on 
wages, minimum wage policy had no statistically significant effect on employment. This may not be 
surprising, as care providers may have initially used staffing quite efficiently due to the limited public 
funding of social care services. Reducing staffing further might not have been possible without 
affecting the quality of service provision. 
The only notable negative effect of minimum wage policy we found was on employment conditions, 
more specifically on slowing down the downward trend in employment on zero-hours contracts. This 
finding provides an explanation for the ‘elusive’ employment effect that has not been previously 
explored. 
Although there is no evidence of important negative effects of minimum wage policy, the pressure 
on the long-term care sector is likely to increase in the coming years, due to limited public 
expenditure and the planed rapid increase in National Living Wage. The way care providers will 
manage to adjust to this challenges as well as the effects of wage increases on the insufficient labour 
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Figure 1. Kernel density estimates of LTC workers hourly wage employed in the independent 
sector by care type – July 2015 and September 2016 
 
Note: The sample includes LTC workers employed by independent sector providers with up-to-date records. Source: Skills 




Table 1. Changes in outcomes 
Variable Service type Sector Obs Sep16 Jul15 Diff p-val 
Mean hourly wage Residential care Private 1,840 8.070 7.714 0.356 0.000 
  Voluntary 822 8.187 7.823 0.364 0.000 
 Domiciliary care Private 349 8.121 7.816 0.305 0.000 
  Voluntary 340 9.343 9.097 0.245 0.148 
No. of employees Residential care Private 2,276 35.892 35.782 0.111 0.909 
  Voluntary 937 21.934 21.571 0.363 0.724 
 Domiciliary care Private 521 50.772 49.693 1.079 0.758 
  Voluntary 375 20.267 19.880 0.387 0.869 
Zero-hours contract rate Residential care Private 1,554 0.037 0.040 -0.003 0.383 
  Voluntary 789 0.021 0.054 -0.033 0.000 
 Domiciliary care Private 277 0.446 0.433 0.013 0.712 
  Voluntary 327 0.033 0.101 -0.068 0.000 
Share of staff with nursing qualification Residential care Private 914 0.055 0.057 -0.002 0.640 
  Voluntary 316 0.016 0.016 -0.001 0.879 
 Domiciliary care Private 156 0.015 0.015 0.000 0.998 
  Voluntary 100 0.011 0.009 0.002 0.676 
Service users per staff rate Residential care Private 2,276 1.672 1.669 0.003 0.913 
  Voluntary 937 2.052 2.065 -0.013 0.804 
 Domiciliary care Private 521 0.930 0.926 0.004 0.945 
  Voluntary 375 2.315 2.669 -0.354 0.003 
Turnover rate Residential care Private 1,811 0.268 0.229 0.039 0.000 
  Voluntary 501 0.185 0.171 0.014 0.257 
 Domiciliary care Private 357 0.295 0.276 0.019 0.291 
  Voluntary 108 0.187 0.211 -0.024 0.399 
Vacancy rate Residential care Private 1,274 0.038 0.039 -0.001 0.833 
  Voluntary 411 0.047 0.040 0.007 0.214 
 Domiciliary care Private 282 0.085 0.087 -0.003 0.793 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 Residential care Domiciliary care 
Variable Obs Mean StdDev Obs Mean StdDev 
Diff in log of mean wage (Sep16-Jul15) 2,662 0.047 0.065 689 0.035 0.114 
Difference on log of employment (Sep16-Jul15) 3,213 0.008 0.234 896 0.007 0.402 
Diff in zero-hours contracts (ZHC) rate (Sep16-Jul15) 2,343 -0.013 0.130 604 -0.031 0.181 
Diff in share of staff with nursing qualif. (Sep16-Jul15) 1,230 -0.002 0.027 256 0.001 0.017 
Diff in service users per staff rate (Sep16-Jul15) 3,213 0.015 0.393 896 0.022 0.544 
Difference in turnover rate (Sep16-Jul15) 2,312 0.034 0.202 465 0.009 0.208 
Difference in vacancy rate (Sep16-Jul15) 1,685 0.001 0.064 351 0.002 0.074 
Share of workers paid less than Apr16 minimum (Jul15) 3,213 0.503 0.335 896 0.307 0.343 
Initial wage gap (Jul15) 3,213 0.039 0.047 896 0.018 0.029 
Diff in log of clients (Sep16-Jul15) 3,213 0.008 0.161 896 0.089 0.445 
   Total clients (Jul15) 3,213 24.517 26.204 896 97.481 281.273 
   Total clients (Sep16) 3,213 24.705 26.244 896 96.098 276.564 
Mean worker age (Jul15) 3,213 41.857 5.132 896 42.054 5.712 
Share of female workers (Jul15) 3,213 0.793 0.177 896 0.803 0.205 
Share of care workers in total staff (Jul15) 3,213 0.645 0.200 896 0.772 0.241 
Establishment size: micro (1-9 workers) 3,213 0.187 0.390 896 0.289 0.454 
Establishment size: small (10-49 workers) 3,213 0.625 0.484 896 0.477 0.500 
Establishment size: medium/large (50+ workers) 3,213 0.188 0.391 896 0.234 0.424 
Sector: private 3,213 0.708 0.455 896 0.581 0.494 
Sector: voluntary 3,213 0.292 0.455 896 0.419 0.494 
User type: old age/dementia 3,213 0.358 0.479 896 0.083 0.275 
User type: young adults 3,213 0.502 0.500 896 0.199 0.399 
User type: mixed 3,213 0.140 0.347 896 0.719 0.450 
Diff in log of res. care Unit Cost (15/16-14/15; LA level) 3,213 0.012 0.112 896 0.016 0.112 
   Residential care Unit Cost (2014/15; LA level) 3,213 747.945 177.703 896 776.880 181.328 
   Residential care Unit Cost (2015/16; LA level) 3,213 757.976 189.108 896 790.880 194.098 
Diff in JSA rate (x100) (Sep16-Jul15; LA level) 3,213 -0.682 0.368 896 -0.641 0.343 
   Job Seeker Allowance (JSA) rate (x100) (Jul15; LA level) 3,213 1.815 0.940 896 1.755 0.881 
   Job Seeker Allowance (JSA) rate (x100) (Sep16; LA level) 3,213 1.133 0.672 896 1.114 0.633 
Region: Eastern 3,213 0.112 0.315 896 0.137 0.344 
Region: East Midlands 3,213 0.078 0.269 896 0.068 0.252 
Region: London 3,213 0.065 0.247 896 0.110 0.314 
Region: North East 3,213 0.070 0.256 896 0.061 0.240 
Region: North West 3,213 0.154 0.361 896 0.116 0.320 
Region: South East 3,213 0.176 0.380 896 0.196 0.398 
Region: South West 3,213 0.119 0.323 896 0.088 0.284 
Region: West Midlands 3,213 0.122 0.327 896 0.136 0.343 
Region: Yorkshire and the Humber 3,213 0.104 0.306 896 0.086 0.280 
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Table 3. OLS estimation results of minimum wage effects 
VARIABLES 
Diff in log of 
mean wage 
(Sep16-Jul15) 
Diff in log of 
employment 
(Sep16-Jul15) 
Diff in ZH 
contract rate 
(Sep16-Jul15) 
Diff in share 
with nurs. qual. 
(Sep16-Jul15) 
Diff in SU per 
staff rate 
(Sep16-Jul15) 
Diff in turnover 
rate (Sep16-
Jul15) 
Diff in vacancy 
rate (Sep16-
Jul15) 
        
 Residential Care 
Share of workers paid less than Apr16 minimum (Jul15) x Private Sector 0.091*** 0.002 0.017** 0.005 -0.012 0.029* 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.021) (0.007) (0.004) (0.032) (0.016) (0.006) 
Share of workers paid less than Apr16 minimum (Jul15) x Voluntary Sector 0.089*** -0.001 0.024*** 0.002 -0.010 0.092*** 0.043*** 
 (0.005) (0.020) (0.007) (0.003) (0.037) (0.032) (0.016) 
Observations 2,662 3,213 2,343 1,230 3,213 2,312 1,685 
R-squared 0.251 0.042 0.640 0.103 0.046 0.204 0.228 
        
Initial wage gap (Jul15) x Private Sector 0.918*** 0.051 0.113 0.005 -0.100 0.077 -0.070 
 (0.053) (0.143) (0.090) (0.034) (0.134) (0.134) (0.086) 
Initial wage gap (Jul15) x Voluntary Sector 0.756*** -0.100 0.112** 0.013 -0.232 1.189*** 0.697*** 
 (0.062) (0.174) (0.056) (0.026) (0.300) (0.332) (0.182) 
Observations 2,662 3,213 2,343 1,230 3,213 2,312 1,685 
R-squared 0.274 0.042 0.638 0.102 0.046 0.205 0.239 
        
 Domiciliary Care 
Share of workers paid less than Apr16 minimum (Jul15) x Private Sector 0.074*** -0.043 0.120*** -0.001 -0.099* -0.023 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.040) (0.040) (0.003) (0.052) (0.030) (0.013) 
Share of workers paid less than Apr16 minimum (Jul15) x Voluntary Sector 0.096*** 0.089 0.145*** 0.001 -0.067 -0.024 0.032 
 (0.020) (0.074) (0.033) (0.006) (0.100) (0.071) (0.030) 
Observations 689 896 604 256 896 465 351 
R-squared 0.063 0.072 0.285 0.057 0.074 0.204 0.215 
        
Initial wage gap (Jul15) x Private Sector 0.857*** 0.115 2.035*** -0.014 -0.581 -0.622* -0.214 
 (0.109) (0.449) (0.661) (0.043) (0.565) (0.329) (0.204) 
Initial wage gap (Jul15) x Voluntary Sector 0.891*** 1.222* 1.327*** -0.018 -0.768 -0.744 0.201 
 (0.232) (0.649) (0.364) (0.038) (0.811) (1.041) (0.208) 
Observations 689 896 604 256 896 465 351 
R-squared 0.064 0.071 0.301 0.057 0.073 0.211 0.219 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
Note: All estimations include controls for worker characteristics (i.e. mean worker age, the share of female workers, and the share of care workers in total staff), establishment characteristics (i.e. size, 
sector, and user type), local area characteristics (i.e. the change in LA-level social care financing as measured by the change in residential care unit costs over the analysed period, and the change in 
the local unemployment level) as well as regional dummies. 
